

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
-----054351 310705Z /11

O 310319Z MAR 78
FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0387
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01180

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PORC, PEPR, MARR, UNSC, PLO, IS, LE, SY
SUBJECT: SOUTH LEBANON: DISCUSSION WITH URQUHART AND
GUYER, MARCH 30

REF: STATE 79930 (NOTAL)

1. AMB LEONARD AND ASST SECY MAYNES HAD GENERAL
DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS RELATING TO UNIFIL AND ITS
MANDATE WITH USYGS URQUHART AND GUYER LATE MARCH 30.
FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS.

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2. LEONARD THREW OUT AS PERSONAL SUGGESTION IDEA OF
UN OFFICIAL, PERHAPS SPECIAL REP OF SYG, BEING
APPOINTED TO BEIRUT TO HANDLE, ON ERSKINE'S BEHALF,
VARIOUS POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND DECISIONS THAT ARISE IN
CONNECTION WITH UNIFIL OPERATIONS. HE COULD BE IN TOUCH
ON A CONTINUING BASIS WITH LEBANESE POLITICAL FIGURES

AND CIVIL AND MILITARY OFFICIALS, WITH PLO (INCLUDING ARAFAT) AND ANY OTHERS WITH WHOM IW WAS NECESSARY TO CONSULT. HE WOULD ALSO BE AVAILABLE, EXPECIALLY AT LATER STAFE WHEN QUESTIONS WOULD BE MORE FREQUENT, TO MAKE DECISIONS AT LOWER LEVELS THAT NEVERTHELESS INVOLVED POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, SUCH AS PROBLEMS ARISING IN CONNECTION WITH RETURN OF POPULATION TO SOUTH (SCREENING, ETC.)

3. BOTH URQUHART AND GUYER REACTED FAVORABLY TO IDEA, COMPARING SUCH POSITION TO THAT OF SYG'S SPECIAL REP IN CYPRUS (ALTHOUGH WITHOUT LATTER'S NEGOTIATING FUNCTION). URQUHART NOTED DIFFICULTY IN FINDING RIGHT PERSON WHO WOULD ALSO BE ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED AND CAUTIONED ABOUT HANDLING APPOINTMENT IN SUCH WAY AS TO NOT REQUIRE SC ACTION. IN THIS CONNECTION HE THOUGHT UNIFIL'S MANDATE TO ASSIST IN RESTORING SOVEREIGNTY OF GOL COULD PROVIDE BASIS. HE AND GUYER SAID THEY WULD LIKE TO CONSIDER IDEA FURTHER BUT THOUGHT THERE WAS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR IT. (NOTE: ADDRESSEES SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS IDEA WITH SIILASVUO, ERSKINE, ET. AL. AT THIS TIME.)

4. URQUHART INQUIRED ABOUT WHAT WE UNDERSTOOD WERE NOW ISRAELI INTENTIONS. MAYNES REPLIED THAT WE WERE PLANNING NEW APPROACH TO GOI ON WITHDRAWAL AND
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THOUGHT UN SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR TIMETABLE.

5. IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SITUATION IN AND AROUND TYRE, GUYER EXPRESSED VIEW THAT UNIFIL COULD GET FAIR NUMBER OF TROOPS INTO THE CITY UNDER COVER OF ITS HEADQUARTERS, FRENCH CONTINGENT HEADQUARTERS, AND HOUSING (FOR LACK OF OTHER SUITABLE PLACE IN AREA) OF FRENCH CONTINGENT. THIS WOULD EASE SITUATION THERE CONSIDERABLY. REAL PROBLEM WAS QASIMIYA BRIDGE, HOWEVER, WHICH UNIFIL COULD NOT TAKE OVER PLO RESISTANCE. (HE WONDERED WHY ISRAELIS HAD NOT TAKEN BRIDGE, EVEN WHILE NOT TRYING TO TAKE TYRE ITSELF.)

6. IN REPLY TO MAYNES' QUERY, GUYER SAID LEBANESE AMB TUENI HAD TOLD SYG WALDHEIM EARLIER IN DAY THAT HE HAD MESSAGE FROM BEIRUT STATING THAT GOL COULD SEND SMALL POLICE UNITS TO POINTS WHERE UNIFIL WAS LOCATED, TO WORK WITH UN. THIS WOULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY SOUTH OF LITANI. IN DISCUSSION OF GENERAL PROBLEM OF GOL'S CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE POLICE AND MILITARY TO WORK WITH OR TAKE OVER FROM UNIFIL, MAYNES EMPHASIZED THAT GOL MUST BE PREPARED TO TAKE AT LEAST SAME RISKS

AS UNIFIL TROOP CONTRIBUTING GOVTS. AT
SAME TIME HE RECOGNIZED PROBLEM OF AVAILABILITY OF TRAINED
PERSONNEL.

7. MAYNES ALSO BROUGHT UP QUESTION OF NEED FOR
RETAINING FLEXIBILITY OF DEFINITION OF UNIFIL'S AREA
OF OPERATIONS. HE ACKNOWLEDGED PRACTICAL
DIFFICULTIES IN CONTEMPLATING EXTENTION OF AREA TO
LOCATIONS NORTH OF LITANI UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

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AT SAME TIME, HE URGED THAT "WE NOT LOCK OURSELVES IN"
ON RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION THAT WOULD PRECLUDE
MOVE INTO OTHER AREAS AT LATER STAGE IF THAT BECAME
FEASIBLE AND DESIRABLE. URQUHART AND GUYER BOTH AGREED
THAT MANDATE PERMITTED SUCH FLEXIBILITY AND THAT,
WHILE EXPANSION WUITE IMPRACTICAL NOW, ANY
RESTRICTIVE DEFINITION SHOULD BE AVOIDED FOR REASONS
MAYNES HAD ADVANCED.

8. LEONARD INQUIRED WHETHER THERE HAD BEEN ANY MORE
"FEELERS" FROM EASTERN EUROPEANS ON PARTICIPATION IN
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UNIFIL. GUYER RESPONDED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE
AND SAID HE HAD CONTEMPLATED APPROACH TO CZECHS
(PRESUMABLY AS SC MEMBERS), WITH IDEA THAT EE
PARTICIPATION WOULD HELP FINANCING AND POSSIBLY
WITH RADICAL ARAB AND PLO ATTITUDES AS WELL. MAYNES
REPORTED OUR INQUIRY TO EMBASSY TEL AVIV
AND ITS VIEW THAT, OTHER THAN ROMANIANS, POLISH
LOGISTIC UNIT WOULD PROBABLY BE LEAST OBJECTIONABLE
TO ISRAELIS. CZECHS, HE NOTED, WOULD PROBABLY NOT
BE ACCEPTABLE. URQUHART WAS PUZZLED AT POLIST ATTITUDE,
SINCE THEY HAD INITIALLY REJECTED THEIR INCLUSION IN
FORCE. HE NOTED ISRAELI ATTITUDE WOULD BE VERY
IMPORTANT BUT THOUGHT RENEWED APPROACH TO
IMPORTANT BUT THOUGHT RENEWED APPROACH TO POLAND MIGHT
NOT BE BAD IDEA, SINCE POLISH UNIT WITH UNEF/UNDOF
WAS NOW (AFTER INITIAL ISRAELI SUSPICION)
GREAT SUCCESS WITH ISRAELIS. WELLS

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